By National Academy of Sciences, Policy and Global Affairs, Office of International Affairs, Committee on International Security and Arms Control
Delivering a nontechnical assessment of advancements in nuclear fingers regulate, this e-book describes how the us and the Soviet Union arrived at their modern positions - and the place they could pass from the following. It additionally indicates that the complexities of fingers regulate may be effectively defined in a nontechnical demeanour.
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Extra resources for Nuclear arms control background and issues
Verification has always been associated with disarmament and arms control proposals. For a long time it seemed to provide an almost impenetrable barrier to progress in the field. President Eisenhower's proposal in the mid-1950s for open skies by means of aircraft reconnaissance and other highly intrusive inspection proposals had little prospect at that time of being accepted by a closed Soviet society and would probably not have been well received by many in the United States. In the 1960s reconnaissance satellites created a technological revolution in the possibilities of verification without highly intrusive measures.
Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. OVERVIEW 20 1979, President Carter asked the Senate to discontinue the SALT II ratification process. This action reflected both the President's desire to link ratification of the treaty to acceptable Soviet behavior in an unrelated area and his recognition of the linkage of the upcoming Senate vote on ratification to the adverse public reaction to Soviet behavior in Afghanistan. The recently terminated INF negotiation is the most obvious example of direct linkage of the arms control process to external objectives.
Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. OVERVIEW 22 the testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapon systems. -Soviet negotiations on such systems. The question remains whether such actions accelerate the negotiating process and point it in a favorable direction or weaken negotiating leverage to obtain the best agreement.
Nuclear arms control background and issues by National Academy of Sciences, Policy and Global Affairs, Office of International Affairs, Committee on International Security and Arms Control